In this seminar we discuss issues in the theoretical and empirical analysis of market power in (international) gas pipeline networks. Market power plays a role, both, in the evaluation of access regulation as well as the assessment of investment into new pipelines. We will critically review various contributions in the literature, relying on non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, respectively. We are particularly interested in how specific assumptions on the interaction of players shape the results.
You are expected to make a presentation on one of the papers listed below, to actively participate in seminar discussion, and to write a seminar paper on your topic.
Organization: At the first meeting we will make final assignments and schedule the rest of the meetings and presentations. One day before your presentation, you are expected to hand in the slides in *.pdf format. Papers have to be handed in ashard-copy (stapled, no binding) and soft-copy, again only in *.pdf format.
Prerequisites: Solid knowledge of microeconomics (optimization theory), game theory and industrial organization. Basic knowledge of power system economics as it is covered in the course: Network Based Energy Systems.
- Course owner: Franz Hubert